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LEGISLATIVE LIAISON

84-4692

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

December 10, 1984

Chief of Legislative Liaison  
The Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Sir:


Enclosed you will find correspondence from [redacted]  
[redacted] regarding the alleged suppression of evidence that  
the Bulgarian government organized the attempt to assassinate  
the Pope.

I hope that you can provide me with information that  
will be helpful in addressing the concerns expressed in the  
letter. I would appreciate receiving your response in  
duplicate and the return of the original correspondence as  
soon as possible. Please direct your reply to the attention  
of Don Mitchell.

Thank you for your time and effort.

Best regards.

Sincerely,



John Glenn  
United States Senator

JG/damb  
Enclosure

STAT

07 Nov 84

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The Honorable John Glenn  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Glenn,

I am concerned about stories that U.S.  
intelligence bureaus suppressed or overlooked,  
unwittingly or knowingly, evidence that the  
Bulgarian government organized the attempt  
to assassinate the Pope.

(I enclose recent articles by Wm. Safire and  
by Geo. Will.)

I feel that the situation demands a  
thoroughgoing "retracing of the analysis".  
in light of the shocking display of incom-  
petence in this matter. One shudders to  
imagine explanations other than incompetence.

Respectfully,

STAT

# The empire is indeed evil

BY GEORGE F. WILL

WASHINGTON

The view from London's Waterloo Bridge — up the Thames toward Wren's dome on St. Paul's, down toward the House of Parliament — encompasses striking symbols of the West's attainments. But the bridge itself is now a symbol of the brazenness of the West's enemies.

Georgi Markov, 49, was walking across the bridge on Sept. 7, 1978, heading home from his work at the studios of the BBC External Services. Suddenly he felt a sting on the back of his thigh and, turning, saw a man bending to retrieve an umbrella. The man, with a foreign accent, murmured, "I'm sorry."

Markov did not mention the incident to his wife, but early the next morning he suffered a raging fever and said: "I have a horrible feeling that this may be connected with something which happened yesterday." Markov, Bulgaria's leading man of letters before he defected, had received many threats and warnings. One warning said he would be poisoned by a substance, tested in Moscow, that causes a high fever.

Scotland Yard announced that doctors found in his thigh a tiny pellet containing ricin, a rare poison extensively studied in Eastern Europe. There is no known antidote. The pellet was a highly sophisticated bit of murder technology. It was made of a platinum-iridium alloy which the human body does not reject. It was the size of a pinhead and had four openings to hold the poison.

A similar pellet had been used in an unsuccessful assassination attempt against another Bulgarian defector in Paris. A few days after Markov died, a lieutenant general in Bulgaria's security force delivered a speech expressing "the deepest gratitude to our Soviet comrades-in-arms of the KGB for their constant help and comradely assistance."

You can read the book that got Markov killed. "The Truth That Killed" (published by Ticknor & Fields) is the autobiography he broadcast to Bulgaria, thereby enraging the regime. Markov's only child, who was just 2 when he died, asked her mother, "Why did daddy write those things if he loved us?" Her mother replied that daddy thought Bulgaria's rulers would not risk the scandal that might result from killing him. But the real scandal is that there is so slight, and so fleeting, a sense of being scandalized by

the act perpetrated by, and may be attributed to, the so-called "Bulgarian regime" — the Bulgarian regime.

The Bulgarian justice grinds slowly, but they grind exceedingly well and are grinding to dust the pretense that the Turkish gunman acted alone. There is now not the slightest reason to doubt that his attack was organized by Bulgarians, who would not have undertaken such an audacious crime without the approval of the highest Soviet authorities.

None of this news to anyone who has read Claire Sterling's book, "The Time of the Assassins." Her work on this case is the journalistic achievement of the age. Her most appalling evidence strongly suggests complicity by some democracies, including this one, in covering up the Soviet crime. The cover-up that Italian authorities are pulling apart, thread by thread, demands this action:

The U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee should call in U.S. intelligence leaders and march them through Sterling's book, page by page, asking why they have learned so much more than the intelligence agencies, collectively, did. The Intelligence Committee should dwell on her accounts of attempts by U.S. agents to discourage her investigations. The real "crime of the century" is the complicity of democracies in suppressing evidence of the Soviet crime, and the relations between East and West become unpleasantly realistic.

The relations to be with a nation like the Soviet Union, a nation now killing its dissidents by medical means, describing the kidnapping, the "urban-terrorist style," of the defectors, the Economist (of London) says that the extraordinary fact is that this atrocity was not the work of a mere terrorist gang, but an action "approved by Soviet ruling circles," in violation of Soviet law and the equally worthless 1975 Helsinki human-rights undertakings.

It is a pity that the six-month anniversary of that kidnapping fell on the eve of the U.S. election.

The 1980 consecutive election in which all issues should be secondary to this one who best understands the evil empire of which Bulgaria is a loathsome instrument? That issue is not the main reason why Reagan will win, but it is the main reason he should.

Will is a columnist for the Washing-

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ESSAY | William Safire

## Retracing the Analysis

**W**ASHINGTON  
Margaret Thatcher escaped and  
Indira Gandhi was cut down;  
Ronald Reagan lived and  
Anwar Sadat died. The Pope survived  
and a pro-Soviet Polish priest was  
secretly murdered. Every world  
leader is the target of a madman,  
or national hero, or religious fan-  
atic, or even a world leader willing to  
employ violence.

That last category is what worries  
our strategists. It turns out that a  
few journalists, even right about the  
involvement of the Soviet-controlled  
Bulgarian army in the shoot-  
ing of the Pope, have the trust that  
détente and other agreements with  
the Soviet Union is maintained.

The evidence of conspiracy  
produced by Italian prosecutors  
means that our C.I.A., charged with  
keeping the President and National  
Security Council informed about the  
international scene of the century,  
was inapt in its reporting and  
wholly mistaken in its evaluation.

We know that some of our intelli-  
gence operatives did all they could to  
pour cold water on the jury and to  
discourage the Italian authorities  
from pursuing their investigation.

As detailed here two years ago, the  
C.I.A. vice-chief of station in Rome  
scoffed at Interior Minister Virginio  
Rognoni's description of the conspir-  
acy to kill the Pope. "You have no  
proof," insisted our man on the scene,  
in the presence of an astounded Senate  
Committee staff member. This deroga-  
tion paralleled a Soviet campaign to  
dissociate the K.G.B. from any con-  
nection with the deed.

"I think it is absolutely scandal-  
ous," charged Zbigniew Brzezinski  
after more evidence appeared this  
week, "that some officials in the  
State Department and some senior of-  
ficials in the C.I.A. were unwitting —  
or in some cases, perhaps even wit-  
ting — tools of that campaign."

When a former national security  
adviser grumbles about his dovish  
former adversaries in the State De-  
partment, that's not news; but when a  
man of experience in the use of intelli-  
gence information suggests the possi-  
bility of a "witting help" — or mole —  
in the C.I.A., that is worthy of note.

Mr. Brzezinski has more than a  
passing interest in this case. As he re-  
counts in his memoir, during the first  
week of December 1981 the C.I.A.  
warned of the possibility of a Soviet  
Army move into Poland. The lame-  
duck President authorized his na-  
tional security adviser to put in a call  
to the Pope to brief him on our infor-  
mation. Speaking in Polish, Mr. Brze-  
zinski and the Pope had a conversa-  
tion that was, in Zbig's words, "his-

## Let's review U.S. data on terrorism

The Russians must have known of  
this call, as well as of other activities  
of Pope John Paul II in his native Po-  
land, where Solidarity was catching  
fire. Yuri Andropov, then head of the  
K.G.B., could logically have come to  
the conclusion that only the elimina-  
tion of the leading symbol of Polish  
nationalism would end the incipient  
revolt. Six months later, the attack on  
the Pope took place.

Since that time, Mr. Brzezinski and  
an associate who was formerly the  
C.I.A. station chief in Ankara have  
been among the few to encourage re-  
porters to follow this story. This was  
in the face of repeated C.I.A. evalua-  
tions given to the Senate Intelligence  
Committee, and presumably to the  
President, that the "tragedy was too  
clumsy" for the assassination at-  
tempt to have involved the Russians.

The conspiracy theorists seem now  
to have been right and the official  
pooh-poohers wrong. In any well-run  
intelligence agency, an error of this  
magnitude would result in a laborious  
operation called "retracing the  
analysis." The purpose would be to  
discover who made what wrong as-  
sessment, based on what misleading  
information, from what sources now  
to be considered unreliable — and  
why we tried to help the Russians by  
disseminating the mistaken analysis.

In that way, the C.I.A. would learn  
who misinformed our policy makers  
and why. If it was just sloppy work,  
the offenders would learn from their  
mistakes. If Mr. Brzezinski's care-  
fully raised suspicion is correct, and  
some tools of Russian disinformation  
were "witting" — surely a long shot,  
but never to be overlooked — then the  
retracing would prove that very good  
management, but good security.

Now it is up to the Senate Select  
Committee on Intelligence, with Sena-  
tors Durenberger and Leahy replacing  
Senators Goldwater and Magnuson, to  
make certain the agency does the re-  
tracing. The purpose is not to embar-  
rass, but to correct. If assassination is  
a weapon the Russians have been  
using, in what Pope John Paul called  
today "the chain of atrocity that is  
staining the world with blood," we  
cannot afford to have naive C.I.A.  
field.